A growing body of evidence suggests that children succeed in nontraditional false-belief tasks in the first years of life. However, few studies have examined individual differences in infants' and toddlers' performance on these tasks. Here we investigated whether parental use of mental-state language (i.e. think, understand), which predicts children's performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks at older ages, also predicts toddlers' performance on a nontraditional task. We tested 2.5-year-old children in a verbal nontraditional false-belief task that included two looking time measures, anticipatory looking and preferential looking, and measured parents' use of mentalstate language during a picture-book task. Parents' use of mental-state language positively predicted children's performance on the anticipatory-looking measure of the nontraditional task. These results provide the first evidence that social factors relate to children's false-belief understanding prior to age 3 and that this association extends to performance on nontraditional tasks. These findings add to a growing number of studies suggesting that mental-state language supports mental-state understanding across the lifespan.
Introduction
The ability to predict and interpret the behavior of other individuals in terms of their unobservable mental states (e.g., goals, preferences, beliefs) is essential for navigating the social world. Researchers have long been interested in when and how this critical psychological reasoning ability develops. In particular, considerable research has focused on when children understand that others can be mistaken, or hold false beliefs, about the world. Early investigations into this question relied on traditional elicited-response false-belief tasks, which require children to answer direct questions about the likely behavior of a mistaken agent (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983 ). Children's performance on such tasks led to the conclusion that the capacity to represent false beliefs does not emerge until at least age 4 (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ).
However, this conclusion has been challenged by recent evidence from alternative, nontraditional tasks that do not require children to answer direct questions about a mistaken agent. In these tasks, researchers instead measure a variety of other responses that children produce as they observe or interact with a mistaken agent, including their looking behavior (e. . Over 30 published studies using nontraditional false-belief tasks have now reported positive results with children between 6 months and 3 years of age (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017; Scott, Roby, & Smith, 2017) . These findings have led many researchers to conclude that the capacity to represent false beliefs emerges in the first year of life (e.g., Barrett et al., 2013; Buttelmann et al., 2009; Carruthers, 2013; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Luo, 2011; Scott, 2017; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007) . Despite the growing body of research using nontraditional falsebelief paradigms, very few studies have examined individual variation in infants' and toddlers' performance on these tasks. Thus, little is known about individual differences in early false-belief understanding and what factors might be responsible for such differences. In particular, it is an open question whether the same factors that predict preschoolers' performance on traditional elicited-response tasks also predict younger children's performance on nontraditional false-belief 
